作者：英国《金融时报》专栏作家 戴维•皮林
2010年03月12日 07:08 AM
如果韩俊是正确的，未来30年将有相当于德国、法国、英国、意大利、韩国、南非、西班牙、波兰和加拿大人口总和的中国人，迁居到该国不断膨胀的城市里。韩俊是中国国务院发展研究中心农村问题专家。他估计，到 2040年，中国将仅有4亿农村人口，较目前减少5亿。按照这一假定，中国的城市居民数量将远远超过10亿，从而推动城市居民人口在总人口中所占比例从 45%升至70%左右。
这些令人吃惊的数字，不禁让人脑海里浮现出大规模人口迁徙、北京、上海和广州这样的大城市人口规模增长三、四倍的情景。实际上，情况不太可能是那样的。毕竟，中国是一个计划经济国家。既便如此，研究了中国城市化趋势的麦肯锡全球研究所(McKinsey Global Institute)，描绘了这样一幅情景：到2025年，中国将出现15座超级城市，每座城市平均拥有2500万人口。与此同时，随着国家在内陆大举建设新的城镇中心，以及土地用途的改变使城乡之间的差别变得模糊，许多城市将“搬到”农村。
这并非未来主义的幻想。根据某些统计数据，目前中国已经有170座人口超过100万的城市。相比之下，美国有9座，而英国只有2座。就人口规模而言，天津就是中国的纽约，青岛是洛杉矶。
中国拥有庞大人口规模的二、三线城市的出现，令企业对可能产生的消费热潮垂涎不已。源源不断的城市新居民，的确可能成为未来厨房电器、保险和汽车的购买者。市政当局将需要公共交通系统、电网和电信设备。正如麦肯锡所言，中国城市化可能成为未来数十年最重要的商业机遇。
这里有一个问题。规划者不仅需要建设实体基础设施来适应这种城市化潮流，更艰难的是，中国将不得不制定一个法律框架。就目前而言，在已经从农民变身为工厂或建筑工人的大约2亿人中，大部分没有获得城市的永久居住权。毛泽东在上世纪50年代为限制国内人口流动而制定的户籍制度，将中国的城市人口划分为两个等级 ——拥有特权的正式居民和被边缘化的民工。
根据北京理工大学的研究，仅在北京一地，在过去3年出生的46万名婴儿中，就有一半左右无法登记为正式居民。中国有数千万人生活在法律的中间状态。他们被列为农村居民——尽管这些人可能大部分时间甚至一直在城市工作——因此无法获得各种社会服务，包括有补贴的住房，收入补助和子女教育。麻省理工学院(MIT)的中国问题专家黄亚生表示，该制度是“不人道的”，并对经济具有损害作用。他称，废除户籍制度，将会一举缩小城乡收入差距，释放出社会上弱势群体被压制的需求，鼓励他们消费。
中国领导人多年来一直在谈论户籍制度改革。这一主题切合当前领导层（胡锦涛和温家宝）的工作重心。对他们而言，建设和谐社会是一个不变的主题。最近温家宝在互联网聊天论坛上——想象一下在“聊天轮盘” (Chat Roulette)上不经意间遇到中国总理——表示，户籍改革是工作重点，这稍稍提高了人们对于改革的期盼。更不寻常的是，13家报纸共同发表社论，以近乎革命性的措辞，（相当准确地）谴责户籍制度违反中国宪法，变成了困住中国人的“无形枷锁”。它发出震耳发聩的声音：“不合时宜地存在数十年之久之弊政至今仍时时困扰着我广大民众。”
这篇社论似乎有些过头。它冒犯了共产党的宣传部门。该文已在多数网站上消失，其中一位作者还丢掉了高级编辑的职位。温家宝上周在全国人大上作报告时，只是含糊地谈到有必要逐步推进户籍制度改革，这让那些期盼大胆改革的人失望。
不难看出中国政府为何对过快推进户籍改革感到紧张。如果处理不当，它可能导致人们蜂拥而至比较富裕的中心城市。即使修订了相关法律，让那些已经住在城市的农民工得到合法地位，多数地方政府仍缺乏资金，难以为这些新近得到资格的城市居民提供住房、教育和其它福利。
突兀的变革可能带来革命性的影响。革命当然是中国政府最不愿看到的局面。然而，中国政府确实希望改革，原因之一是农村的贫穷也同样是潜在的不稳定因素。逐步向城市转移人口可能带来巨大的经济效益。的确，至少10座城市（包括深圳和武汉）已经尝试了户籍制度改革。全球最大规模的城市化进程难以阻挡。现在是立法跟上现实的时候了。
译者/何黎
Friday, April 30, 2010
Thursday, April 29, 2010
张春贤的新挑战
作者：中国独立时事评论员 陈杰人 为英国《金融时报》中文网撰稿
2010年04月26日 06:12 AM
4月24日上午，新疆维吾尔自治区召开领导干部大会宣布人事变动，根据中央决定，湖南省委书记张春贤接替在新疆工作了19年并担任一把手长达15年的王乐泉，自此，新疆的政治由“新疆王”时代迈入“新疆张”时代。
这次新疆宣布人事变动，有一点让人注目的地方，那就是出席人规格之高。我查阅了很多资料后发现，多年以来，中央宣布一个省委书记的人事变动，通常是中组部副部长出席并宣布。规则最高的，也不过是在俞正声调任上海市委书记时，由政治局委员、中组部长李源潮宣布。当时虽然身为政治局常委的习近平出席了这一活动，但他是以老书记的名义交接工作。而这次张春贤赴任乌鲁木齐，居然由党内组织工作的最高领导人、政治局常委习近平出席并讲话，足见此番中央对新疆人事变动的高度重视。
中央对新疆工作的高度重视，有太多的理由。这里疆域辽阔，资源丰富，与多国接壤，民族问题复杂，社会稳定工作任务繁重，世界舆论密集紧盯。从某种意义上来说，新疆是当前中国政治中最敏感的地区之一，在这块土地上发生的哪怕一件小事，也可能引起世界政坛和舆论的关注，甚至因此影响到中国在国际上的形象。
有鉴于此，中央在选择新疆主政者的时候，比起选择其他省委书记，必然要进行更仔细的斟酌，征求更广泛的意见，作出更审慎的决策。结合新疆当前各项工作的实际和它的敏感性来看，现时代能够主政新疆的人，必须是各方面都表现优秀，足以让中央放心，让新疆各族人民能够接受并寄予厚望的、不折不扣的优秀政治家。光凭这一点，足见张春贤在中国政治家队伍中的地位。
纵观张春贤自担任交通部长跃入正部级实职官员队伍以来的种种表现，尤其是他担任湖南省委书记以来的5年工作，人们普遍认为，他至少在几个方面让公众欣赏，一是他的开明态度和创新精神，二是务实的作风，三是民主的风范，四是高效的工作能力，如果考虑到他政治上的成熟和可靠，那么让这样的人去主政新疆，实际上也意味着中央新疆工作战略的适度调整。
在笔者看来，选择张接替王，至少意味着新疆工作将在未来一段时期发生下列变化:
首先，新疆工作将由过去管治主导型，转向管治与注重民主民生并重，这也是当前新疆各地区发展不平衡所带来的必然变化，事实证明，只有更加重视民生，重视新疆各族人民的切身利益和新疆本身的发展，才能促使新疆各族人民更加团结，社会更加安定，新疆和兄弟省市及中央政府的关系更好。
其次，新疆工作将切实加强基层基础建设。张春贤在主政湖南期间，提出了“一化三基”的战略，在湖南大力很抓基础设施、基础产业和基础工作，以促进新型工业化。当时，很多湖南干部还不理解为什么一个省委书记要抓“基础”二字，现在看来，这个方向很对路。湖南的“一化三基”，其实也得到了中央的高度认同和赞赏。相信此番张春贤入主乌鲁木齐，一定也包含这个方面的期许，那就是，未来一段时期，新疆的发展基础将有焕然一新的变化。相信经过5到10年，新疆真的能够让人们刮目相看。
再次，新疆将进一步对世界开放。张春贤这些年来之所以颇得公众和媒体好评，特别是也能得到国际舆论的肯定，和他的政治开明态度有密切关系。就在今年“两会”期间，张春贤面对众多国内外记者明确表示，如果需要，他的财产马上就可以公开。一个高级干部作出这样的承诺，其实并不容易。结合张春贤平时重视互联网、尊重网民意见、决策民主、用人富具远见和策略等表现来看，人们有理由相信，他是中共下一代政治家中具有真正民主情怀、开放意识和现代理念的代表。让张主政新疆，必然使新疆从过去神秘莫测走向开放透明。这也必然促使新疆的工作更符合民意，更注重民生。
中央和新疆干群的高度信任与重视，对张春贤来说意味着高度的责任，而上述可能的转变，对这位新任主官更意味着崭新的挑战。因为，要实现新疆工作的进步与转变，光靠书记一个人的态度和行动还不够。对于张春贤来说，他未来的工作必然面临如下挑战：
第一，如何充分贯彻中央新疆工作的新思路新决策，并把这些积极的决策和思路传达贯彻到新疆各级干部和全区民众，使之化作人民共同的力量。要做到这一点，张春贤就必然要改变过去新疆部分干部保守的思维和因循守旧的行为模式，就必然要大力促动各级干部大兴务实调研之风，只有先让干部真正走入到各族人民的家中，倾听他们的意见，解决他们的困难，才能真正团结全区人民奋发努力，才能真正得到人民的认可和信任。
第二，在新疆这个特别的地方，高级管理者必然面对解决民生和遏制分裂并重的工作局面。这两项工作，在理念、思维模式、行动方法上都存在天壤之别，要做到两者并重，就必然需要一个政治家高超的政治技巧。将来，张春贤如何做到一手“硬”一手“软”，以硬治恐怖势力和分裂势力，以软关怀民生，这是需要技巧的。
第三，新疆部分地区一直处于发展落后局面，甚至拉下了很多的工作任务。张春贤到任后，如何做到重点突出，甚至在某些领域和地区矫枉过正，采取倾斜政策以促进部分地区后发赶超，也需要好好斟酌。
第四，新疆的工作虽然属于中国内政，但实际上却是世界关注的话题。张春贤如何在将来的工作中，既抓好内政，同时也要积极、有效地向世界展示新疆的新面貌、新局面、新人心，以争取国际上更多舆论支持和其他认同，从而为中国执政者增分，为新疆谋福祉，也需要高超的现代公关技巧和外交能力。
（注：本文仅代表作者本人观点）
2010年04月26日 06:12 AM
4月24日上午，新疆维吾尔自治区召开领导干部大会宣布人事变动，根据中央决定，湖南省委书记张春贤接替在新疆工作了19年并担任一把手长达15年的王乐泉，自此，新疆的政治由“新疆王”时代迈入“新疆张”时代。
这次新疆宣布人事变动，有一点让人注目的地方，那就是出席人规格之高。我查阅了很多资料后发现，多年以来，中央宣布一个省委书记的人事变动，通常是中组部副部长出席并宣布。规则最高的，也不过是在俞正声调任上海市委书记时，由政治局委员、中组部长李源潮宣布。当时虽然身为政治局常委的习近平出席了这一活动，但他是以老书记的名义交接工作。而这次张春贤赴任乌鲁木齐，居然由党内组织工作的最高领导人、政治局常委习近平出席并讲话，足见此番中央对新疆人事变动的高度重视。
中央对新疆工作的高度重视，有太多的理由。这里疆域辽阔，资源丰富，与多国接壤，民族问题复杂，社会稳定工作任务繁重，世界舆论密集紧盯。从某种意义上来说，新疆是当前中国政治中最敏感的地区之一，在这块土地上发生的哪怕一件小事，也可能引起世界政坛和舆论的关注，甚至因此影响到中国在国际上的形象。
有鉴于此，中央在选择新疆主政者的时候，比起选择其他省委书记，必然要进行更仔细的斟酌，征求更广泛的意见，作出更审慎的决策。结合新疆当前各项工作的实际和它的敏感性来看，现时代能够主政新疆的人，必须是各方面都表现优秀，足以让中央放心，让新疆各族人民能够接受并寄予厚望的、不折不扣的优秀政治家。光凭这一点，足见张春贤在中国政治家队伍中的地位。
纵观张春贤自担任交通部长跃入正部级实职官员队伍以来的种种表现，尤其是他担任湖南省委书记以来的5年工作，人们普遍认为，他至少在几个方面让公众欣赏，一是他的开明态度和创新精神，二是务实的作风，三是民主的风范，四是高效的工作能力，如果考虑到他政治上的成熟和可靠，那么让这样的人去主政新疆，实际上也意味着中央新疆工作战略的适度调整。
在笔者看来，选择张接替王，至少意味着新疆工作将在未来一段时期发生下列变化:
首先，新疆工作将由过去管治主导型，转向管治与注重民主民生并重，这也是当前新疆各地区发展不平衡所带来的必然变化，事实证明，只有更加重视民生，重视新疆各族人民的切身利益和新疆本身的发展，才能促使新疆各族人民更加团结，社会更加安定，新疆和兄弟省市及中央政府的关系更好。
其次，新疆工作将切实加强基层基础建设。张春贤在主政湖南期间，提出了“一化三基”的战略，在湖南大力很抓基础设施、基础产业和基础工作，以促进新型工业化。当时，很多湖南干部还不理解为什么一个省委书记要抓“基础”二字，现在看来，这个方向很对路。湖南的“一化三基”，其实也得到了中央的高度认同和赞赏。相信此番张春贤入主乌鲁木齐，一定也包含这个方面的期许，那就是，未来一段时期，新疆的发展基础将有焕然一新的变化。相信经过5到10年，新疆真的能够让人们刮目相看。
再次，新疆将进一步对世界开放。张春贤这些年来之所以颇得公众和媒体好评，特别是也能得到国际舆论的肯定，和他的政治开明态度有密切关系。就在今年“两会”期间，张春贤面对众多国内外记者明确表示，如果需要，他的财产马上就可以公开。一个高级干部作出这样的承诺，其实并不容易。结合张春贤平时重视互联网、尊重网民意见、决策民主、用人富具远见和策略等表现来看，人们有理由相信，他是中共下一代政治家中具有真正民主情怀、开放意识和现代理念的代表。让张主政新疆，必然使新疆从过去神秘莫测走向开放透明。这也必然促使新疆的工作更符合民意，更注重民生。
中央和新疆干群的高度信任与重视，对张春贤来说意味着高度的责任，而上述可能的转变，对这位新任主官更意味着崭新的挑战。因为，要实现新疆工作的进步与转变，光靠书记一个人的态度和行动还不够。对于张春贤来说，他未来的工作必然面临如下挑战：
第一，如何充分贯彻中央新疆工作的新思路新决策，并把这些积极的决策和思路传达贯彻到新疆各级干部和全区民众，使之化作人民共同的力量。要做到这一点，张春贤就必然要改变过去新疆部分干部保守的思维和因循守旧的行为模式，就必然要大力促动各级干部大兴务实调研之风，只有先让干部真正走入到各族人民的家中，倾听他们的意见，解决他们的困难，才能真正团结全区人民奋发努力，才能真正得到人民的认可和信任。
第二，在新疆这个特别的地方，高级管理者必然面对解决民生和遏制分裂并重的工作局面。这两项工作，在理念、思维模式、行动方法上都存在天壤之别，要做到两者并重，就必然需要一个政治家高超的政治技巧。将来，张春贤如何做到一手“硬”一手“软”，以硬治恐怖势力和分裂势力，以软关怀民生，这是需要技巧的。
第三，新疆部分地区一直处于发展落后局面，甚至拉下了很多的工作任务。张春贤到任后，如何做到重点突出，甚至在某些领域和地区矫枉过正，采取倾斜政策以促进部分地区后发赶超，也需要好好斟酌。
第四，新疆的工作虽然属于中国内政，但实际上却是世界关注的话题。张春贤如何在将来的工作中，既抓好内政，同时也要积极、有效地向世界展示新疆的新面貌、新局面、新人心，以争取国际上更多舆论支持和其他认同，从而为中国执政者增分，为新疆谋福祉，也需要高超的现代公关技巧和外交能力。
（注：本文仅代表作者本人观点）
Sunday, April 25, 2010
Edmund Phelps
On April 15, 2010, 77-year-old Nobel laureate (economics, 2006) and Columbia professor Edmund S. Phelps became dean of the New Huadu Business School, Minjiang University (first time hear about this school). Not sure what to make of this - yet - but will keep watching. (My initial reaction was that Prof. Phelps has hurt his own prestige by becoming employed by a completely unknown Chinese school, but that could very well be wrong.)
From his own website:
April 15, 2010
Appointed as President-Dean
New Huadu Business School
Minjiang University
Fuzhou
PDF of Speech
photo from Getty Images
From his own website:
April 15, 2010
Appointed as President-Dean
New Huadu Business School
Minjiang University
Fuzhou
PDF of Speech
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
WSJ: The SEC vs. Goldman
华尔街日报撕下了温情脉脉的面纱，毅然跳到小金人的一边，向美国证监会勇猛地开火了。
The Securities and Exchange Commission's complaint against Goldman Sachs is playing in the media as the Rosetta Stone that finally exposes the Wall Street perfidy and double-dealing behind the financial crisis. Our reaction is different: Is that all there is?
After 18 months of investigation, the best the government can come up with is an allegation that Goldman misled some of the world's most sophisticated investors about a single 2007 "synthetic" collateralized debt obligation (CDO)? Far from being the smoking gun of the financial crisis, this case looks more like a water pistol.
***
Let's deconstruct the supposed fraud, in which Goldman worked with hedge fund investor John Paulson, who wanted to bet on a decline in the subprime mortgage market. The SEC alleges that Goldman let Paulson & Co. dictate the mortgage-backed securities on which investors would speculate via the CDO, and then withheld from investors Paulson's role on the other side of the transaction.
The SEC also alleges that Goldman deceived ACA Management—a unit of the largest investor on the other side of the deal and the firm officially selecting which mortgage-backed securities everybody would bet on—into believing that Mr. Paulson was actually investing in an "equity" tranche on ACA's side of the deal.
Regarding the second point, the offering documents for the 2007 CDO made no claim that we can find that Mr. Paulson's firm was betting alongside ACA. The documents go so far as to state that an equity tranche was not offered by Goldman, as ACA must have known since it helped put the deal together and presumably read the documents. The SEC complaint itself states that ACA had the final word on which assets would be referenced in the CDO. And in some cases, ACA kicked out of the pool various assets suggested by the Paulson firm.
More fundamentally, the investment at issue did not hold mortgages, or even mortgage-backed securities. This is why it is called a "synthetic" CDO, which means it is a financial instrument that lets investors bet on the future value of certain mortgage-backed securities without actually owning them.
Yet much of the SEC complaint is written as if the offering included actual pools of mortgages, rather than a collection of bets against them. Why would the SEC not offer a clearer description? Perhaps the SEC's enforcement division doesn't understand the difference between a cash CDO—which contains slices of mortgage-backed securities—and a synthetic CDO containing bets against these securities.
More likely, the SEC knows the distinction but muddied up the complaint language to confuse journalists and the public about what investors clearly would have known: That by definition such a CDO transaction is a bet for and against securities backed by subprime mortgages. The existence of a short bet wasn't Goldman's dark secret. It was the very premise of the transaction.
Did Goldman have an obligation to tell everyone that Mr. Paulson was the one shorting subprime? Goldman insists it is "normal business practice" for a market maker like itself not to disclose the parties to a transaction, and one question is why it would have made any difference. Mr. Paulson has since become famous for this mortgage gamble, from which he made $1 billion. But at the time of the trade he was just another hedge-fund trader, and no long-side investor would have felt this was like betting against Warren Buffett.
Not that there are any innocent widows and orphans in this story. Goldman is being portrayed as Mr. Potter in "It's a Wonderful Life," exploiting the good people of Bedford Falls. But a more appropriate movie analogy is "Alien vs. Predator," with Goldman serving as the referee. Mr. Paulson bet against German bank IKB and America's ACA, neither of which fell off a turnip truck at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets.
IKB describes itself as "a leading investor in CDOs" and "a leading credit manager in the German market." ACA, for its part, participated in numerous similar transactions. The Journal reports that ACA was known for embracing more risk than its competitors, because, with a less-than-stellar credit rating, it had a higher cost of capital.
By the way, Goldman was also one of the losers here. Although the firm received a $15 million fee for putting the deal together, Goldman says it ended up losing $90 million on the transaction itself, because it ultimately decided to bet alongside ACA and IKB. In other words, the SEC is suing Goldman for deceiving long-side investors in a transaction in which Goldman also took the long side. So Goldman conspired to defraud . . . itself?
As for the role this trade played in the financial crisis, its main impact was transferring $1 billion from the long-side housing gamblers to Mr. Paulson. Ultimately, this meant big losses for the Royal Bank of Scotland, which acquired one of the long-side players after the transaction and had to be rescued by a capital injection from the U.K. government. But RBS made more than enough bad choices of its own that contributed to its failure. These hedge-fund trades make for entertaining tales of financial derring-do, but they are hardly the root of the panic.
***
Which leads us to the real impact of this case, which is political. The SEC charges conveniently arrive on the brink of the Senate debate over financial reform, and its supporters are already using the case to grease the bill's passage. "I'm pleased that the Obama Administration is using all of the tools in its arsenal to bring accountability to Wall Street and standing up for homeowners and small businesses across America," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on Friday about the SEC case. "This is also why we need to pass strong Wall Street reform this year." Of course, this case matters to homeowners not at all.
We have had our own disputes with Goldman, and we've criticized the firm for its explanations of its dealings with AIG. We have also urged the Senate to rewrite its flawed financial regulatory-reform bill precisely because it would benefit Goldman and other giant banks with explicit bailout powers available to assist them. There are serious questions about the role of Goldman and other too-big-to-fail banks in the American financial market. Yet this case addresses none of these questions.
Perhaps the SEC has more evidence than it presented in its complaint, but on the record so far the government and media seem to be engaged in an exercise in hindsight bias. Three years later, after the mortgage market has blown up and after the panic and recession, the political class is looking for legal cases to prove its preferred explanation that the entire mess was Wall Street's fault. Goldman makes a convenient villain. But judging by this complaint, the real story is how little villainy the feds have found.
The SEC vs. Goldman
More a case of hindsight bias than financial villainy.
More a case of hindsight bias than financial villainy.
The Securities and Exchange Commission's complaint against Goldman Sachs is playing in the media as the Rosetta Stone that finally exposes the Wall Street perfidy and double-dealing behind the financial crisis. Our reaction is different: Is that all there is?
After 18 months of investigation, the best the government can come up with is an allegation that Goldman misled some of the world's most sophisticated investors about a single 2007 "synthetic" collateralized debt obligation (CDO)? Far from being the smoking gun of the financial crisis, this case looks more like a water pistol.
***
Let's deconstruct the supposed fraud, in which Goldman worked with hedge fund investor John Paulson, who wanted to bet on a decline in the subprime mortgage market. The SEC alleges that Goldman let Paulson & Co. dictate the mortgage-backed securities on which investors would speculate via the CDO, and then withheld from investors Paulson's role on the other side of the transaction.
The SEC also alleges that Goldman deceived ACA Management—a unit of the largest investor on the other side of the deal and the firm officially selecting which mortgage-backed securities everybody would bet on—into believing that Mr. Paulson was actually investing in an "equity" tranche on ACA's side of the deal.
Regarding the second point, the offering documents for the 2007 CDO made no claim that we can find that Mr. Paulson's firm was betting alongside ACA. The documents go so far as to state that an equity tranche was not offered by Goldman, as ACA must have known since it helped put the deal together and presumably read the documents. The SEC complaint itself states that ACA had the final word on which assets would be referenced in the CDO. And in some cases, ACA kicked out of the pool various assets suggested by the Paulson firm.
More fundamentally, the investment at issue did not hold mortgages, or even mortgage-backed securities. This is why it is called a "synthetic" CDO, which means it is a financial instrument that lets investors bet on the future value of certain mortgage-backed securities without actually owning them.
Yet much of the SEC complaint is written as if the offering included actual pools of mortgages, rather than a collection of bets against them. Why would the SEC not offer a clearer description? Perhaps the SEC's enforcement division doesn't understand the difference between a cash CDO—which contains slices of mortgage-backed securities—and a synthetic CDO containing bets against these securities.
More likely, the SEC knows the distinction but muddied up the complaint language to confuse journalists and the public about what investors clearly would have known: That by definition such a CDO transaction is a bet for and against securities backed by subprime mortgages. The existence of a short bet wasn't Goldman's dark secret. It was the very premise of the transaction.
Did Goldman have an obligation to tell everyone that Mr. Paulson was the one shorting subprime? Goldman insists it is "normal business practice" for a market maker like itself not to disclose the parties to a transaction, and one question is why it would have made any difference. Mr. Paulson has since become famous for this mortgage gamble, from which he made $1 billion. But at the time of the trade he was just another hedge-fund trader, and no long-side investor would have felt this was like betting against Warren Buffett.
Not that there are any innocent widows and orphans in this story. Goldman is being portrayed as Mr. Potter in "It's a Wonderful Life," exploiting the good people of Bedford Falls. But a more appropriate movie analogy is "Alien vs. Predator," with Goldman serving as the referee. Mr. Paulson bet against German bank IKB and America's ACA, neither of which fell off a turnip truck at the corner of Wall and Broad Streets.
IKB describes itself as "a leading investor in CDOs" and "a leading credit manager in the German market." ACA, for its part, participated in numerous similar transactions. The Journal reports that ACA was known for embracing more risk than its competitors, because, with a less-than-stellar credit rating, it had a higher cost of capital.
By the way, Goldman was also one of the losers here. Although the firm received a $15 million fee for putting the deal together, Goldman says it ended up losing $90 million on the transaction itself, because it ultimately decided to bet alongside ACA and IKB. In other words, the SEC is suing Goldman for deceiving long-side investors in a transaction in which Goldman also took the long side. So Goldman conspired to defraud . . . itself?
As for the role this trade played in the financial crisis, its main impact was transferring $1 billion from the long-side housing gamblers to Mr. Paulson. Ultimately, this meant big losses for the Royal Bank of Scotland, which acquired one of the long-side players after the transaction and had to be rescued by a capital injection from the U.K. government. But RBS made more than enough bad choices of its own that contributed to its failure. These hedge-fund trades make for entertaining tales of financial derring-do, but they are hardly the root of the panic.
***
Which leads us to the real impact of this case, which is political. The SEC charges conveniently arrive on the brink of the Senate debate over financial reform, and its supporters are already using the case to grease the bill's passage. "I'm pleased that the Obama Administration is using all of the tools in its arsenal to bring accountability to Wall Street and standing up for homeowners and small businesses across America," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on Friday about the SEC case. "This is also why we need to pass strong Wall Street reform this year." Of course, this case matters to homeowners not at all.
We have had our own disputes with Goldman, and we've criticized the firm for its explanations of its dealings with AIG. We have also urged the Senate to rewrite its flawed financial regulatory-reform bill precisely because it would benefit Goldman and other giant banks with explicit bailout powers available to assist them. There are serious questions about the role of Goldman and other too-big-to-fail banks in the American financial market. Yet this case addresses none of these questions.
Perhaps the SEC has more evidence than it presented in its complaint, but on the record so far the government and media seem to be engaged in an exercise in hindsight bias. Three years later, after the mortgage market has blown up and after the panic and recession, the political class is looking for legal cases to prove its preferred explanation that the entire mess was Wall Street's fault. Goldman makes a convenient villain. But judging by this complaint, the real story is how little villainy the feds have found.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
Conferences
2009.11
WSJ
Chinese Financial Markets Conference
中国金融市场年会
http://chinese.wsj.com/cfm/CFM2010.shtml
2010.1.7
National Committee on US-China Relations
China's Economy in 2010: A Forum at the NYSE
http://www.ncuscr.org/programs/chinas-economy-2010-forum-nyse
WSJ
Chinese Financial Markets Conference
中国金融市场年会
http://chinese.wsj.com/cfm/CFM2010.shtml
2010.1.7
National Committee on US-China Relations
China's Economy in 2010: A Forum at the NYSE
http://www.ncuscr.org/programs/chinas-economy-2010-forum-nyse
Friday, April 16, 2010
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
WSJ's Alan Murray interviews David Rubenstein (March 18, 2010)
Breakfast interview sounds like a great idea.
Viewpoints: Executive Breakfast Series.
David M. Rubenstein is a Co-Founder and Managing Director of The Carlyle Group, one of the world’s largest private equity firms. Mr. Rubenstein co-founded the firm in 1987. Since then, Carlyle has grown into a firm managing more than $87 billion from 19 offices around the world.
Mr. Rubenstein, a native of Baltimore, is a 1970 magna cum laude graduate of Duke, where he was elected Phi Beta Kappa. Following Duke, Mr. Rubenstein graduated in 1973 from The University of Chicago Law School, where he was an editor of the Law Review. He was admitted to the Washington, D.C. Bar Association in 1981 but is currently inactive.
From 1973-75, Mr. Rubenstein practiced law in New York with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. From 1975-76 he served as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. From 1977-1981, during the Carter Administration, Mr. Rubenstein was Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. After his White House service and before co-founding Carlyle, Mr. Rubenstein practiced law in Washington with Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge (now Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw Pittman).
Mr. Rubenstein is a Regent of the Smithsonian Institution and on the Board of Directors or Trustees of Duke University, Johns Hopkins University, University of Chicago, the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts (Vice Chairman), the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Johns Hopkins Medicine, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute for Advanced Study, the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, the National Museum of American History of the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Asia Society, the American Academy in Berlin, American Council on Germany, and Ford’s Theatre.
Mr. Rubenstein is President of the Economic Club of Washington and is also a member of The Business Council, Visiting Committee of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the Dean’s Council at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the Advisory Board of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, the Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution, Advisory Board of School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University, the Trustees’ Council of the National Gallery of Art, the Madison Council of the Library of Congress, the International Business Council of the World Economic Forum, the Council of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and Harvard Business School’s Board of Dean’s Advisors.
Viewpoints: Executive Breakfast Series.
David M. Rubenstein is a Co-Founder and Managing Director of The Carlyle Group, one of the world’s largest private equity firms. Mr. Rubenstein co-founded the firm in 1987. Since then, Carlyle has grown into a firm managing more than $87 billion from 19 offices around the world.
Mr. Rubenstein, a native of Baltimore, is a 1970 magna cum laude graduate of Duke, where he was elected Phi Beta Kappa. Following Duke, Mr. Rubenstein graduated in 1973 from The University of Chicago Law School, where he was an editor of the Law Review. He was admitted to the Washington, D.C. Bar Association in 1981 but is currently inactive.
From 1973-75, Mr. Rubenstein practiced law in New York with Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. From 1975-76 he served as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments. From 1977-1981, during the Carter Administration, Mr. Rubenstein was Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy. After his White House service and before co-founding Carlyle, Mr. Rubenstein practiced law in Washington with Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge (now Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw Pittman).
Mr. Rubenstein is a Regent of the Smithsonian Institution and on the Board of Directors or Trustees of Duke University, Johns Hopkins University, University of Chicago, the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts (Vice Chairman), the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Johns Hopkins Medicine, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Institute for Advanced Study, the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, the National Museum of American History of the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Asia Society, the American Academy in Berlin, American Council on Germany, and Ford’s Theatre.
Mr. Rubenstein is President of the Economic Club of Washington and is also a member of The Business Council, Visiting Committee of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the Dean’s Council at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, the Advisory Board of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, the Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution, Advisory Board of School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University, the Trustees’ Council of the National Gallery of Art, the Madison Council of the Library of Congress, the International Business Council of the World Economic Forum, the Council of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and Harvard Business School’s Board of Dean’s Advisors.
Friday, April 09, 2010
Vocabulary
2011
9.6
trekker
8.10
rags-to-riches entrepreneurs
glitterati: the fashionable set of people engaged in show business or some other glamorous activity.
7.17
zany (amusingly unconventional and idiosyncratic) antics (foolish, outrageous, or amusing behavior)
7.15
feisty: having or showing exuberance and strong determination
6.30
Gag order
6.25
panache: flamboyant confidence of style or manner
5.9
run-of-the-mill: lacking unusual or special aspects; ordinary
writer's block
5.8 zing: energy, enthusiasm, or liveliness
5.7 bait and switch
4.7 circadian rhythm 生物钟; full bore (at full speed or maximum capacity)
4.6 persona non grata: an unacceptable or unwelcome person
3.1 lionize
2.22 bandshell
2010
9.6
trekker
8.10
rags-to-riches entrepreneurs
glitterati: the fashionable set of people engaged in show business or some other glamorous activity.
7.17
zany (amusingly unconventional and idiosyncratic) antics (foolish, outrageous, or amusing behavior)
7.15
feisty: having or showing exuberance and strong determination
6.30
Gag order
6.25
panache: flamboyant confidence of style or manner
5.9
run-of-the-mill: lacking unusual or special aspects; ordinary
writer's block
5.8 zing: energy, enthusiasm, or liveliness
5.7 bait and switch
4.7 circadian rhythm 生物钟; full bore (at full speed or maximum capacity)
4.6 persona non grata: an unacceptable or unwelcome person
3.1 lionize
2.22 bandshell
12.19
cornucopia: a symbol of plenty consisting of a goat's horn overflowing with flowers, fruit, and corn
12.15
Armageddon: (in the New Testament) the last battle between good and evil before the Day of Judgment. "Armageddon of the brain" -- Michael Jackson "Stranger in Moscow"
12.11
shades of green
11.30
on the ropes: [boxing] forced against the ropes by the opponent's attack.
11.21
self-possessed: having a firm belief in one's own powers
11.18
petrify: "I was completely petrified since I knew nothing about immigration law or immigration hearings."
10.28
Four-minute mile
10.21
take a pass
9.28
terra incognita
global laughingstock
9.25
cave in, climb down, blink.
5.3
also-ran: There's a new world order for banks, and the Chinese, for the first time, are the biggest, with a market capitalization that has made perennial No. 1 Citigroup Inc. a distant also-ran behind Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd., China Construction Bank Corp. and Bank of China Ltd.
4.9
Hakuna matata is a Swahili phrase that is literally translated as "There are no worries". It is sometimes translated as "no worries", although is more commonly used similarly to the English phrase "no problem".
4.8
Carpe Noctem
3.19
storm in a teacup
3.1
fit the bill
quicker on the draw
fly by the seat of one's pants: to proceed or work by feel or instinct without formal guidelines or experience
pas de deux: step of two
2.15
agoraphobia: extreme or irrational fear of crowded spaces or enclosed public places
funky: modern or stylish in an unconventional or striking way.
showstopper:
1) an act, song, or performer that wins applause so prolonged as to interrupt a performance
2) a problem that is known to be unsolvable and will bring the project to a halt.
2.8
beholden: I don't like to be beholden to anybody.
yarmulke: 犹太小帽
bonhomie: cheerful friendliness, geniality; 好性情，温和，和蔼
doppelganger: an apparition or double of a living person
(Alex Heckscher: Doppelganger week is over)
sine qua non
2009
5.6
tresor trové: french rules
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
